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'Rationalism'), is better-attested evidence for facts; yet the evidence is now utterly discredited, and the facts, then apparently so plenty, occur no more. Mr. Gurney considers this objection, and comes to an extremely interesting result. After "careful search through about 260 books on the subject (including the principal ones of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries) and a large number of contemporary records of trials," he affirms that the only facts of witchcraft for which there is any good evidence whatever are those neuropathic phenomena (trance, anaesthesia, hysteria, 'suggestion,' etc.) which, so far from being now discredited, are more than ever ascertained; while the marvels like conveyance through the air, transformation into animals, etc., do not rest on a *single* first-hand statement made by a person not 'possessed' or under torture.

The authors' theory of veridical phantasms is that they are caused by thought-transference. The ghost theory and the 'astral-form' theory are criticised as unsatisfactory (ghosts of clothes, phantasms not seen by all present, etc.). Thought-transference has been once for all established as a *vera causa*. Why not assume that even the impressions announcing death were made during the last moments of the dying person's life?

Where the apparition is to several witnesses, this explanation has to be much strained; and, in spite of Messrs. Myers's and Gurney's ingenuity, I can hardly feel as if they had made out a very plausible case. But any theory helps the analysis of facts; and I do not understand that Messrs. Gurney and Myers hold their telepathic explanation to have at present much more than this provisional sort of importance.

I have given my impression of the ability of the work. My impression of its success is this: the authors have placed a matter which, previous to them, had been handled so loosely as not to compel the attention of scientific minds, in a position which makes inattention impossible. They have established a presumption, to say the least, which it will need further statistical research either to undo or to confirm. They have at the same time made further statistical research easy; for their volumes will certainly stimulate the immediate registration and publication, on a large scale, of cases of hallucinations (both veridical and casual) which but for them would have been kept private. The next twenty-five years will then probably decide the question. Either a flood of confirmatory phenomena, caught in the act, will pour in, in consequence of their work; or it will *not* pour in — and then we shall legitimately enough explain the stories here preserved as mixtures of odd coincidence with fiction. In the one case Messrs.

Gurney and Myers will have made an epoch in science, and will take rank among the immortals as the first effective prophets of a doctrine whose ineffectual prophets have been many. In the other case they will have made as great a wreck and misuse of noble faculties as the sun is often called to look down upon. The prudent bystander will be in no haste to prophesy; or, if he prophesy, he will hedge. I may be lacking in prudence; but I feel that I ought to describe the total effect left at present by the book on my mind. It is a strong suspicion that its authors will prove to be on the winning side. It will surprise me after this if neither 'telepathy' nor 'veridical hallucinations' are among the beliefs which the future tends to confirm.

WILLIAM JAMES.

MURRAY'S HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY.

DR. MURRAY has written an excellent elementary text-book for students of psychology. In the present state of that science, it is difficult to present its doctrines in a form suitable for didactic purposes. It is often necessary for the author to leave untouched certain important questions, the settlement of which is only possible by a controversial excursion into the department of metaphysics.

Dr. Murray's book is not a treatise on physiological psychology, although the conclusions of physiologists seem to be familiar to him. He has occupied himself chiefly with what is called 'subjective psychology,'—a field which must be traversed before one can enter upon the more positive science of the relation of psychical to nervous states. He treats of psychology and its method, gives a full and satisfactory account of sensation, analyzing the knowledge given by the various senses, and noticing the subject of general or organic sensations. This is followed by an account of association and its laws, and a short chapter on comparison. These subjects constitute what he describes as 'general psychology.'

'Special psychology' has to do with 'cognitions, feelings, and volitions,'—a threefold division, corresponding to the classical partition of 'intellect, feeling, and will.' Under the head of 'cognitions' we find an account of perceptions, generalization, reasoning, idealization, illusory cognitions, and a chapter on the general nature of knowledge, which discusses 'self-consciousness, time, space, substance, and cause' from the psychological rather than the metaphysical point of view. After an introduction treating of the nature of pleasure and pain and the expression

A handbook of psychology. By J. CLARK MURRAY. London, Gardner, 1885.

and classification of the feelings, are chapters on the feelings of sense, feelings originating in association, feelings for self and for others, feelings originating in comparison, intellectual feelings, and feelings of action. Four chapters are devoted to volition, the last treating briefly of the freedom of the will.

As we said above, the book is an excellent one, and few serious sins of commission can be charged against it. We question somewhat the advisability of the abrupt divorce of perception and sensation as kinds of mental conditions. Mr. Sully, in his 'Outlines of psychology,' agrees with the author in his separation of these states or actions. It seems to us that a sensation is nothing more than a nervous stimulus unless it is perceived. Perception is the perception of a sensation, and nothing more. When we pass beyond the perception of sensations to a knowledge, say, of objects, we may explain that knowledge either by the association of the perceptions, or by the union of the perceptions in the act of conception. For this reason we believe that those who, with Sir William Hamilton, use the term 'sense-perception,' use an awkward term, but one which is scientifically accurate.

The author's treatment of the process of representation is one of the most unsatisfactory parts of the book. His account of association is not sufficient to give information about all that we call popularly 'memory.' We also fail to find any chapters on reflex action or on the highly important subject of unconscious mental modifications. On the other hand, Dr. Murray's simple and interesting account of illusory cognitions deserves high commendation, and his classification of the feelings seems to us to be both natural and scientific.

The author (p. 23, *et seq.*) appears to view with but little favor the results of investigation in the department of psychophysics. We have no space to discuss the question how far his caution or scepticism is justified. On both sides of the Atlantic this branch of psychology is enjoying a very extraordinary share of attention, and suggestive and interesting results have been reached. We are inclined to regard these investigations as of less importance than those engaged in them are disposed to attach to them, and we confess that we await with some expectancy results commensurate with the amount of labor expended in gathering the statistics which form so prominent a part of the periodical literature on philosophy.

Dr. Murray's closing chapter on the freedom of volition, we regard as perhaps the least scientific part of his book. His doctrine is suggested in the sentence, "The very nature of volition, therefore,

would be contradicted by a description of it in terms which brought it under the category of causality" (p. 417).

The book, however, is admirably adapted for teaching the elements of psychology to classes in schools and colleges.

TWO VALUABLE PRIMERS OF POLITICS.

It has been said that greater ability is needed to develop and elucidate fundamental principles than to deduce from them an elaborate set of conclusions. This is doubtless true; and for that reason most primers, whether of literature, history, science, or politics, are failures, in that they are the work of well-meaning but insufficiently and narrowly informed students. That leading specialists can use their talents to good purpose in writing primers, and thus bring their influence directly to bear on the generation in process of education, has been amply demonstrated by Professors Huxley, Roscoe, Balfour Stewart, Geikie, Michael Foster, Jevons, and others. The two little books to which we have reference in the heading of this notice rank, with the works of the authors just mentioned, as primers that are worth something. They have something in common, in that they are written primarily for English readers by an English woman and an English man respectively. There the resemblance ceases. Miss Buckland's primer¹ is a summary of existing English institutions, and we are free to say that we have never seen them more clearly, more concisely, and more accurately pictured. Miss Buckland draws to a large extent from the books in the 'English citizen' series on particular institutions and phases of English politics, but the completeness and articulation of this little book are peculiarly her own. She treats of the constitution in general, of the sovereign, parliament, the house of lords, the house of commons, the privy council, the national budget, the English church, education in England, local government, and so on. The careful reader will obtain from the book a very thorough knowledge of the workings of English governmental institutions; and it is just such a book as a teacher should use for a few weeks with a class that has completed the study of English history, in order to enable the pupils to follow and discuss intelligently current English politics. We do not recall an inexact or wrong statement in the book, considered simply as an exposition. On p. 34 is an obvious misprint, £71,000 being given as the amount of the annual allowance to the Queen's family. The correct sum is £171,000, and it is so stated by Miss Buckland on p. 9.

¹ *Our national institutions: a short sketch for schools.* By ANNA BUCKLAND. London, Macmillan, 1886. 16°.